CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATES'

RIGHTS-MINIMALLY

OB-

TRUSIVE MEANS REQUIRED IN IMPOSING DESEGREGATION REMEDY UPON LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT-MiSsouri v.

Jenkins, 110

S. Ct. 1651 (1990).
Principles of comity' require a federal district court to re-2
spect the integrity and function of a local governing institution.
On occasion, the United States Supreme Court has invoked the
principle of comity in limiting a district court's power to craft remedial orders.3 Specifically, the Court has utilized principles of
comity in the area of school desegregation where the district
courts have flexible remedial powers. 4 In this regard, the Court
has sought to prevent the district courts from judicially overreaching into local affairs. 5
Recently, in Missouri v. Jenkins,6 the Court confronted the issue of whether a federal district court has the power to impose a
tax increase upon a local school district as part of a desegregaI Comity is defined as a courtesy. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 242 (5th ed. 1979).
"In general [the] principle of 'comity' is that courts of one state or jurisdiction will
give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a
matter of obligation but out of deference and mutual respect." Id.
2 See Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1314 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that
principles of federal/state comity require district courts to use "minimally obtrusive methods" in imposing judicial remedies); Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 117
Ariz. 192, 198, 571 P.2d 689, 695 (1977) ("principle of'comity' is that the courts of
one state or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another
state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and mutual
respect"); Nowell v. Nowell, 408 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966) (interpreting comity as a recognition granted between sovereignties for legislative, executive,
or judicial acts).
3 See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of
Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler,
427 U.S. 424 (1976); Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145
(1965); Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
4 See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley
(Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1 (1971); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Brown v.
Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
5 See Swann, 402 U.S. at 1, infra notes 36-45 and accompanying text. See also
Milliken I, 433 U.S. at 279 (suggesting that the Court has never addressed the issue
of whether federal courts can order remedial education programs as part of a
school desegregation remedy); L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE 258, 283 (1976)
(criticizing the Brown II decision for failing to clarify the techniques to be used by a
district court in future desegregation programs); Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92
YALE L.J. 585 (1983) [hereinafter Gewirtz, Remedies] (discussing problems courts
face when attempting to fashion judicial remedies for racial segregation in the
schools).
6 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990).
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tion remedy. 7 Specifically, the Court considered whether a district court abused its discretion by ordering a property tax
increase on a local school district in order to ensure funding for a
desegregation order.' The Jenkins Court held that the district
court, by imposing such a tax increase rather than directing and
authorizing local government institutions to devise and implement their own remedies, contravened principles of federal and
state comity. 9
In 1977, students from the Kansas City, Missouri School District (KCMSD) filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Missouri alleging that the State
of Missouri, along with various other school districts in Kansas
City, maintained racially segregated public schools.' ° The district court determined that the State of Missouri and the KCMSD
operated a racially segregated public school system in violation
of the students' rights under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment."
Subsequently, the State of Missouri and the KCMSD pro7 Id. at 1655.

Id. at 1662-63.
9 Id. at 1663. In so holding, the Court declined to address more complex constitutional issues regarding the scope of a district court's authority. Id. at 1662-63.
10 Id. The original complaint alleged that state action had led to interdistrict
segregation. Id. at 1656 n.2. Subsequently, upon the KCMSD's realignment by the
district court as a party defendant, students filed an amended complaint further
alleging intradistrict segregation. Id. See School Dist. v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp.
421, 442 (W.D. Mo. 1978). The KCMSD then cross-claimed against the state, requesting indemnification for possible liability that may arise out of the KCMSD's
maintenance of a segregated school district. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1655-56. The
complaint was comprised of three general allegations, "describ(ing] the metropolitan region, the constitutional violation and resulting injury, and a description of the
remedy sought." School Dist., 460 F. Supp. at 427. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that the state failed to remedy racially discriminatory policies in the KCMSD
and as a result, public school segregation in the district persisted. Id. at 428. The
plaintiffs further asserted that the district's discriminatory practices worsened due
to migratory movements of middle class students away from the KCMSD, known as
"white flight." Id. See also Gewirtz, Remedies, supra note 3, at 628-43 (describing
effects of white flight on racially segregated school district). Lastly, the plaintiffs
claimed that as a result of the segregation, operating expenses increased while tax
bases decreased. School Dist., 460 F. Supp. at 428. The plaintiffs sought a judicial
order re-assigning students throughout all school districts on racially balanced criteria. Id. The district court dismissed the complaints filed against several other
suburban school districts, determining that there was insufficient evidence of interdistrict segregation. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1488 (W.D. Mo.
1984).
''Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1505. In accordance with its findings, the district
court ordered the KCMSD Board of Education and the State Board of Education to
prepare desegregation plans. Id. at 1505-06.
8
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posed an expansive desegregation plan in order to racially integrate Kansas City's various school districts. 2 The district court
ordered that the costs of the desegregation plan be paid by both
the State of Missouri and the KCMSD. t1 Missouri state law, however, prohibited the KCMSD from raising its tax levies in order
to finance its share of the plan. 4 After the KCMSD failed to
raise sufficient funds through alternative methods, 5 the district
12 Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 22-23 (W.D. Mo. 1985). The final desegregation program proposed, in part, the following: improvement of student
achievement; reduction in class sizes; implementation of summer school programs;
early childhood development programs; magnet school programs; staff development programs; and mandatory student reassignment. Id. at 26-41. Moreover, the
district court directed the KCMSD to prepare a study to determine which type of
magnet school system would attract the largest number of non-minorities. Id. at
34-35. See Price & Stern, Magnet Schools As A Strategy ForIntegration and School Reform,
5 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 291 (1987).
13 Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 43-44. The district court opined that the State of
Missouri had the "primary responsibility for insuring that the public education systems in the State comport with the United States Constitution." Id. at 43 (quoting
Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1506). Therefore, the court ordered Missouri to pay approximately 75% of the estimated costs. Id. at 43-44. Specifically, the district court
opined:
Since the minority students in the KCMSD are the victims of racial
discrimination which was mandated by the Constitution and Statutes
of the State of Missouri, it is only equitable to place the greatest burden of removing the vestiges of such discrimination and the continuing effects of same on the state rather than on those who are the
victims.
Id. at 23-24. The court of appeals, however, disagreed with the district court's allocation of costs, and remanded the case with the order to divide the costs equally
between the state and the KCMSD. SeeJenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 685 (8th
Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987). On remand, however, the
district court found it " 'clearly inequitable' to require the population of KCMSD to
pay half of the desegregation cost, and that 'even with court's help it would be very
difficult for the KCMSD to fund more than 25% of the cost of the entire remedial
plan.' " Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1657.
14 Section 11 (b) of the Missouri Constitution states in pertinent part:
Any tax imposed upon such property by municipalities, counties or
school districts, for their respective purposes, shall not exceed the following annual rates:

For school districts formed of cities and towns . . . one dollar and
twenty-five cents on the hundred dollars assessed valuation; For all
other school districts-sixty-five cents on the hundred dollars assessed valuation.
Mo. CoNsT. art. X, § 11 (b). In addition, section 11 (c) of the Missouri Constitution
provides in part that, "in all ... school districts the rates of taxation as herein
limited may be increased.., when the rate and purpose of the increase are submitted to a vote and two-thirds of the qualified electors voting thereon shall vote therefor ....
Id. at § 11 (c).
15 SeeJenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 411 (W.D. Mo. 1987). Initially, the
district court opted against imposing a direct tax increase upon the KCMSD, in-
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court disregarded Missouri state law, and ordered a direct increase in property tax levies within the district. 6 Affirming in
part, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
maintained that a district court has the authority to order state
and local officials to levy taxes. 7 The Eighth Circuit, however,
recognized that principles of federal and state comity require that
minimally obtrusive means be utilized to remedy a constitutional
violation.' 8 Thus, the Eighth Circuit held that in the future,
rather than setting the property tax rate itself, the district court
should authorize and direct the local school board to set its own
tax levies in order to adequately fund its share of the desegregation remedy.' 9
The United States Supreme Court granted the state's petistead enjoining the effect of Missouri's tax rollback laws in order to raise
$4,000,000 for the fiscal year. Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 45 (citing Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 163.013 (1967)). Additionally, the district court ordered the KCMSD to submit
to its voters a proposal to increase property taxes in order to pay its share of the
desegregation remedy. Id. After failed attempts to raise money through a vote, the
court still refused to order a tax increase, instead maintaining the injunction on the
tax rollbacks, enabling the KCMSD to raise an additional $6,500,000. Jenkins, 110
S. Ct. at 1657.
'6 Jenkins, 672 F. Supp. at 413. The court determined that the KCMSD had "exhausted all available means of raising additional revenue." Id. at 411. The district
court ordered an increase of the KCMSD's property tax from $2.05 to $4.00 per
$100.00 of assessed valuation through the 1991-92 fiscal year. Id. at 413. The
KCMSD was also ordered to issue $150,000,000 in capital improvement bonds. See
also Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964) (district court may authorize supervisors to "levy taxes to' raise funds adequate to reopen, operate and
maintain without racial discrimination a public school system"); Liddell v. Missouri,
731 F.2d 1294, 1322 (en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 816 (1984) (recognizing that
"the district court's equitable power includes the remedial power to order tax increases or the issuance of bonds").
17 Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1314 (8th Cir. 1988). The appellate court
affirmed the district court's judgment with respect to capital improvements and
magnet schools ordering only slight modifications. Id. at 1299.
18 Id. at 1314. The court advocated that "[d]eference should be given to the
views of concerned state and local officials and to the working of local tax collection
procedures to the extent that they appear compatible with the goals to be
achieved." Id. (citing United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365, 1373 (8th Cir.
1975)).
19 Id. Specifically, the court opined:
We believe a preferable method for future funding of KCMSD's obligation under the district court's desegregation orders is to authorize
the school board to submit a proposed levy to the collection authorities adequate to fund its budget, including its share of the cost of the
desegregation programs ordered by the district court. County and
state authorities should then be enjoined from applying those Missouri constitutional and statutory limitations that would limit or reduce the levy below the amount submitted by the school board.
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tion for certiorari in order to determine whether the judicial tax
increase contravened principles of comity which govern a district
court's exercise of its discretionary powers.2 0 The Court reversed the lower courts' upholding of the tax increase, concluding that such an intrusion into local authority violated governing
21
principles of comity.
The United States Supreme Court initially established equitable guidelines for the imposition of desegregation remedies in
1955, in the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education
(Brown 11).22 In Brown H, the Court announced that while school
authorities will be held responsible for resolving the segregation
problems that exist in their school districts, the district courts
ultimately are responsible for approving and overseeing a
school's desegregation program.23 The Court reasoned that due
to a district court's relative closeness to local conditions, these
courts possess the greatest ability to review whether a school district has complied with desegregation requirements.2 4 The
Court further articulated that when implementing desegregation
remedies, "courts will be guided by equitable principles." '25 Equitable principles, the majority reasoned, should be sufficiently
20 Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1655 (1990). Certiorari was limited to
consideration of whether the district court had the power to levy tax increases and
whether the petition was timely filed. Id. at 1660. See infra notes 73-100 and accompanying text.
21 Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1663. The Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment
insofar as it required modification of the funding order. Id. at 1667.
22 349 U.S. 294 (1955). The first of the Brown v. Board of Education decisions,
(Brown 1), pronounced that official segregation directly violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). The
Brown I Court concluded that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal," thereby depriving minority students of the equal protection of the laws
under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 495. This decision overruled the language
in Plessy v. Ferguson, which enunciated the "separate but equal" doctrine. See
Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494-95 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)). This
pronouncement by the Brown I Court, however, did not alone modify educational
patterns in dual school systems. See id. The reasoning behind Brown I was thus
extended in order to address "the manner in which relief [was] to be accorded."
Brown H, 349 U.S. at 298 (1955). See also Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)
(holding that racial segregation in public schools denies minority students due process of law under the fifth amendment); Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1028-32 (1979) (a discussion of the
history leading to the Brown I decision).
23 Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299-300. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
24 Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299.
25 Id. at 300.
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flexible to reconcile both private and public interests.26
Nearly a decade later, in Griffin v. County School Board,27 the
Court addressed the issue of whether a federal district court may
utilize its discretionary powers to ensure compliance with a desegregation order.28 In Griffin, the Prince Edward County School
Board refused to comply with the district court's order to desegregate its school district. 29 In defiance of the district court's order, the school board refused to levy taxes for the operation of
public schools for that year.30 Consequently, the public schools
of Prince Edward County were closed.3 ' Private foundations,
however, taking advantage of state and local tax credits and tuition grants, established private schools for white children only.32
In deciding Griffin, the Court determined that in order to
26 Id. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944); Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222, 239 (1935).
27 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
28 See id.
29 Id. at 222. The suit began in 1951 when black students of Prince Edward
County, Virginia filed a complaint alleging that they were not granted admission to
public schools, in direct violation of their rights as guaranteed under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 220-21. In May 1955, the
Supreme Court ordered the district court to "admit [the petitioners] to public
schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed ..
" Id. at
221 (citing Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)).
30 Id. at 222. The Virginia General Asssembly announced that no public schools
would operate "where white and colored children were enrolled together," and
ordered that state funds to such schools be cut off. Id. at 221. The legislation was
subsequently invalidated by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, which declared that the laws were in violation of the Virginia Constitution. Id. at 222-23
(citing Harrison v. Day, 200 Va. 439, 106 S.E.2d 636 (1959)).
31 Id. at 222-23. The school board made a public announcement on June 3,
1959, stating:
The School Board of this county is confronted with a court decree
which requires the admission of white and colored children to all the
schools of the county without regard to race or color. Knowing the
people of this county as we do, we know that it is not possible to operate the schools of this county within the terms of that principle and, at
the same time, maintain an atmosphere conducive to the educational
benefit of our people.
Id. at 222 n.6. During the years of 1959 through 1963 colored children in the
county were without any formal education. Id. at 223.
32 Id. at 223-24. A private foundation, known as the Prince Edward School
Foundation, was created to operate private schools in the county for white children.
Id. at 223. An offer to establish private schools for negro children was rejected in
favor of "continuing the legal battle for desegregated public schools." Id. In 1961,
petitioners filed a supplemental complaint, seeking inter alia, to enjoin the county
from aiding in the support of private schools which denied students admission
based on race. Id. at 224. Subsequently, the district court held that "public schools
of Prince Edward County may not be closed to avoid the effect of the law of the
land ..
" Id. The court of appeals reversed the decree, contending that the dis-
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prevent racial discrimination, a district court may require school
commissioners to exercise their power to levy taxes in order to

raise funds necessary to operate a desegregated school district."3

The Court recognized a district court's basic authority to intervene in the processes of local governing bodies in order to ensure compliance with a constitutional mandate. 4 Moreover, the
Court approved an injunction prohibiting county officials from
offering payment of tax credits and tuition grants to private
schools, deeming such action necessary and proper to eradicate
the county's deprivation of public school education to the students of the Prince Edward County school district."
The Court further clarified and defined the duties of local
school authorities as well as the scope of a federal court's authority to eliminate racial segregation in public schools in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.3 6 In 1969, the school
board of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District was ordered
to submit a proposal for faculty and student desegregation." In
trict court should have awaited determination by the state court as to the validity of
the public school closings. Id. at 225.
33 Id. at 232-33.
34 Id. at 281. See aLso Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189 (1973). In Keyes,
the Court endorsed their earlier decision in Brown H, stating:
[W]e have held that where plaintiffs prove that a current condition of
segregated schooling exists within a school district where a dual system was compelled or authorized by statute at the time of our decision
in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1), the State
automatically assumes an affirmative duty 'to effectuate a transition to
a racially nondiscriminatory school system .... I
Id. at 200 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II)).
35 Griffin, 377 U.S. at 233. The Griffin Court concluded that "the time for mere
'deliberate speed' has run out, and that phrase can no longer justify denying these
Prince Edward County school children their constitutional rights to an education
equal to that afforded by the public schools in the other parts of Virginia." Id. at
234. The case was remanded to the district court with the order to enter a decree
ensuring that petitioners would be granted education equal to that given in other
public schools of Virginia. Id.
36 402 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1971). Specifically, the Court in Swann recognized that "[t]he
problems encountered by the district courts and courts of appeals make plain that
we should now try to amplify guidelines, however incomplete and imperfect, for the
assistance of school authorities and courts." Id. at 14 (footnote omitted).
37 Id. at 7. The district court's desegregation order came years after the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school board attempted to desegregate its school system
through "geographic zoning with a free-transfer provision." Id. In June, 1969, the
district court ordered the school board to submit new proposals for both student
and faculty desegregation. d. The district court took such action upon observing
that 90% of the 24,000 black students who were enrolled in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system attended school solely within the metropolitan region of Charlotte and approximately 14,000 black students attended 21 schools consisting of
99-100% black students. Id. at 6-7.
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February 1970, the school board submitted a final desegregation
plan to the district court, aimed at closing certain schools in its
district and reassigning students. 38 The district court eventually
adopted the school board's plan with certain modifications.3 9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the constitutional adequacy of the adopted plan.4 °
The Swann Court reiterated the well-accepted principle that
once a constitutional violation is found the school board has an
38 Id. at 8. In December, 1969, the district court rejected the board's original
proposals. Id. The court subsequently selected an expert in education administration to submit a desegregation plan. Id. In February, 1970, the district court received two alternative pupil assignment plans, the "Finger plan" and the final
"board plan." Id. The Finger plan varied from the school board proposal mainly in
its treatment of the school system's elementary schools. Id. at 9. In addition to
relying upon geographic zoning, the Finger plan proposed the use of pairing, zoning, and grouping techniques, resulting in "student bodies throughout the system [
] rang[ing] from 9% to 38% Negro." Id. The district court specifically described
the Finger plan as follows:
Like the board plan, the Finger plan does as much by rezoning school
attendance lines as can reasonably be accomplished. However, unlike
the board plan, it does not stop there. It goes further and desegregates all the rest of the elementary school by the techniques of grouping two or three outlying schools with one black inner city school; by
transporting black students from grades one through four to the outlying white schools; and by transporting white students from the fifth
and sixth grades from the outlying white schools to the inner city
black school.
Id. at 9-10.
39 Id. at 10. As finally submitted, the plan provided for the closure of seven
schools with student reassignment. Id. at 8. The plan further restructured school
attendance zones in order to remedy racial imbalance, but maintained established
grade structures. Id. The plan, however, rejected pairing and clustering techniques as part of a desegregation effort. Id. Moreover, the plan eliminated the
existing racial basis of the school bus system, created a racially mixed administrative staff and faculty, modified its present free-transfer plan into an optional "majority-to-minority" transfer system and established a single athletic league. Id. at
10. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's plan regarding the junior and
senior high schools and faculty desegregation, but vacated the elementary school
order. Id. Specifically, the court of appeals feared that the elementary school's
pairing and grouping plan would be burdensome to the students and the board. Id.
The court of appeals remanded the case for further reconsideration and for proposal of new plans. Id.
40 Id. at 5, 11. The Swanm Court ruled in favor of reinstating the district court's
order pending further court proceedings. Id. at 10-11. The district court received
two new plans on remand for elementary schools: a proposal submitted by the
United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW plan) and a
proposal prepared by a minority of the school board (minority plan). Id. at 11. The
district court determined that the minority plan, its own plan (Finger plan) and a
previous draft of the Finger plan, were all acceptable. Id. The court ordered the
board to either adopt one of the three plans or submit a new plan that would be
equally effective. Id. The board eventually acquiesced to the adoption of the Finger
plan on August 7, 1970. Id.
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obligation to take affirmative steps to remedy the violation. 4 ' In
addition, the Court charged that if school authorities fail to take
affirmative action to eliminate the vestiges of state-imposed segregation from the public school systems, a court may invoke its
equitable powers to ensure that a desegregation remedy is enforced. 42 In setting forth remedial guidelines for judicial authority, the Court emphasized that a remedial decree must be
imposed in accordance with the extent of the constitutional violation. 43 The Court noted that in this particular instance, the district court's desegregation program, based in part on racial
quotas, student reassignment and transportation, was an effective
technique properly aimed at eliminating segregation in the
school district. 44 The Court concluded that because the desegregation plan implemented by the district court did not exceed the
scope of the school district's violation,
the court did not abuse its
45
relief.
equitable
power in providing
In Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken J),46 the Court confronted the
challenge of limiting a district court's power to implement a desegregation plan.47 In Milliken I, the respondents claimed that
the Detroit public school system was racially segregated and subsequently sought to establish a desegregated school system.48
The district court, upon attempting to formulate a remedial program, discovered that the Detroit public school system posed a
unique problem due to the predominantly black population of
the city's school districts. 49 As a result, the district court ordered
4' Id. at 15 (quoting Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968)).
See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 200 (1973) (upholding school
authority's duty to take affirmative action in unifying its school system).
42 Swann, 402 U.S. at 15. The Court, however, stipulated that "[r]emedialjudicial authority does not put judges automatically in the shoes of school authorities
whose powers are plenary. Judicial authority enters only when local authority defaults." Id. at 16.
43 Id. See Milliken v.Bradley (Milliken 11), 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977), infra notes
59-72 and accompanying text; Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1305 (8th Cir.
1984).
44 Swann, 402 U.S. at 22-31.
45 Id. at 31.
46 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 723.
49 Id. at 728-29 n.8. Specifically, the district court observed that action and inaction by the government and private organizations had led to a segregated metropolitan area. Id. at 724 (quoting Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 587 (E.D.
Mich. 1971)). The district court confronted the issue of determining how to "desegregate a black city, or a black school system." Id. at 728-29 n.8 (citation omitted). In addition, the district court found that the Detroit Board of Education
created and maintained optional attendance zones which "had the 'natural, prob-
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a desegregation plan that included not only the City of Detroit,
but also surrounding suburban districts that were not found to
have committed constitutional violations. 5" The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the multi-district desegregation plan. 5'
The Court reversed and remanded, holding that the scope of
the district court's remedy exceeded that court's equitable authority.5 2 Justice Burger, writing for the majority, explained that
a multi-district remedy may not be instituted absent a finding that
other included school districts failed to operate desegregated
school systems.5" Thus, the Court maintained that before school
district lines will be ignored by the imposition of a cross-district
able, foreseeable and actual effect' of allowing white pupils to escape identifiably
Negro schools." Id. at 725 (quoting Milliken, 338 F. Supp. at 587). The district
court, in support of its findings, stated that "[w]ith one exception . .. defendant
Board has never bused white children to predominantly black schools. The Board
has not bused white pupils to black schools despite the enormous amount of space
available in inner-city schools. There were 22,961 vacant seats in schools 90% or
more black." Id. at 727-28 (quoting Milliken, 338 F. Supp. at 588).
50 Id. at 729-30. The district court ordered the Detroit Board of Education to
formulate a desegregation plan for Detroit. Id. at 729. Moreover, the district court
ordered the state to enact a desegregation plan for the three-county metropolitan
area. Id. In considering the multi-district desegregation plan, the court opined:
[I]t is proper for the court to consider metropolitan plans directed
toward the desegregation of the Detroit public schools as an alternative to the present intra-city desegregation plan before it and, in the
event that the court finds such intra-city plans inadequate to desegregate such schools, the court is of the opinion that it is required to
consider a metropolitan remedy for desegregation.
Id. at 732 (citation omitted).
51 Id. at 734-35. Specifically, the appellate court perceived that "the only feasible desegregation plan involves the crossing of the boundary lines between the
Detroit School District and adjacent or nearby school districts for the limited purpose of providing an effective desegregation plan." Id. at 735 (quoting Bradley v.
Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 249 (6th Cir. 1973) (en banc)).
52 Id. at 752-53. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465 (1979);
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley
(Milliken I1), 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427
U.S. 424,433-34 (1976); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
15-16 (1971).
5 Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 752. The Court promulgated:
[A]n interdistrict remedy might be in order where the racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts caused racial segregation
in an adjacent district, or where the district lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race. In such circumstances an interdistrict remedy would be appropriate to eliminate the interdistrict
segregation directly caused by the constitutional violation. Conversely, without an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there
is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy.
Id. at 745.
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remedy, there must be proof that a constitutional violation exists
within one district, which in turn causes interdistrict segregation.54 The Court emphasized that public education is deeply
rooted in local control and therefore, local autonomy is essential
to maintaining a successful educational system.55 The Court
opined that imposing a multi-district remedy would in effect, alter and disrupt the entire structure of Michigan's public school
system. 56 The Court remanded the case for further proceedings
aimed at formulating an order consistent with its present opinion
to effectively eliminate segregation within the Detroit school
system.5 7
As a result of proposals submitted in compliance with the
59

Milliken I decision, 58 the Court in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I1)

was confronted with the issue of whether a district court may, as
part of a desegregation decree, order remedial or compensatory
educational programs for victims of past acts of segregation.6
The Court additionally addressed the issue of whether a federal
54 Id.
55 Id. at 741-42.

Id. at 753.
Id. After the Milliken I Court handed down its decision, the district court
ordered the submission of desegregation plans limited to the Detroit school system. See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 11), 433 U.S. 267, 271 (1977), infra notes 5972 and accompanying text.
58 On April 1, 1975, both respondent Bradley and the Detroit School Board
submitted their proposed plans. Id. at 271.
59 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
60 Id. at 269. Bradley's proposal was limited to student reassignment. Id. at 271.
The plan called for extensive student transportation to obtain a proper racial ratio
in the school district. Id. To the contrary, the Board's plan was implemented to
"provide[] for sufficient pupil reassignment to eliminate 'racially identifiable white
elementary schools,' while ensuring that 'every child will spend at least a portion of
his education in either a neighborhood elementary school or a neighborhood junior and senior high school." Id. at 272 (quoting Bradley v. Milliken, 402 F. Supp.
1096, 1116 (E.D. Mich. 1975)). The Board's remedial program, called "Educational Components," included in-service teacher training, guidance counseling
programs and testing procedures. Id. A later proposal included reading and communication skills. Id. at 272 n.5. The district court approved the compensatory
educational programs deeming them necessary to fully eliminate the vestiges of
segregation. Id. at 274. Specifically, the district court noted:
We find that the majority of the educational components included in
the Detroit Board Plan are essential for a district undergoing desegregation. While it is true that the delivery of quality desegregated educational services is the obligation of the school board, nevertheless
this court deems it essential to mandate educational components
where they are needed to remedy effects of past segregation, to assure
a successful desegregative effort and to minimize the possibility of
resegregation.
Id. (quoting Milliken, 402 F. Supp. at 1118).
56
57
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district court may order state officials to bear the cost of those

6
remedial programs. '
The Milliken II Court held that the district court did not
abuse its equitable discretion by ordering remedial "educational
components" as part of Detroit's desegregation decree.62 The
Court posited that as in the instant case, the need to effectively
eliminate segregation often requires innovative remedies. 6s
Moreover, the Court ruled that a federal district court may require state authorities to bear the costs of part of such programs.'
In reaching its holding, the Court enunciated three
equitable principles which serve to govern a federal district court
in ordering a desegregation program. 6 5 First, the Court determined that a federal district court must consider the extent of the
constitutional violation,6 6 in order to ensure that the remedy is
tailored to the condition that offends the Constitution. 6 7 Second,
the Court contended that a remedy must attempt to restore individuals to the position that they would have occupied had the
constitutional violation not occurred.68 Finally, the Court emphasized that respect must be granted to state and local authorities in managing and resolving local affairs. 69 The Milliken Court
recognized that, in the instant case, there was no dispute over
whether the second and third principles were properly ob61 Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 277. The district court ordered that the costs of the
remedial program were to be shared equally by both the state and the Detroit
School Board. Id. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's remedial plan
and -the cost sharing proposal. Id.
62

Id. at 279.

63 See Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 283. See also United States v. Montgomery County
Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 236 (1969) (Court permitted faculty and staff desegregation in order to achieve a racially balanced school system).
64 Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 283.
65 Id. at 280-81.
66 Id. at 280 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
16 (1971)).
67 Id. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434 (1976);
Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1), 418 U.S. 717, 763 (1974) (White, J., dissenting);
Swann, 402 U.S. at 26 (1971).
68 Milliken H, 433 U.S. at 280-81 (quoting Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 746). See Green
v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (holding that a district court is
authorized to promulgate plans that promise to realistically work). The Court stipulated that "[o]ur function ... is 'to desegregate an educational system in which the
races have been kept apart, without, at the same time, losing sight of the central
educationalfunction of the schools.' " Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 280 n. 15 (quoting Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 764 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original)).
69 Milliken H, 433 U.S. at 280-81. See Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown H), 349
U.S. 294, 299 (1955) (declaring that "school authorities have the primary responsibility" to resolve desegregation problems).
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served. 70 The Court, however, did address the issue of whether
the district court's remedial order was properly directed toward
the constitutional violation itself.7 ' The Court concluded that
the district court's order did not violate the tenth and eleventh
amendments to the Constitution or general principles of federalism and dismissed the petitioner's claims.72
Recently, in Missouri v. Jenkins,73 the United States Supreme
Court addressed the propriety of a district court order increasing
the property tax levies of a local school district in order to ensure
payment for a desegregation remedy. 4 Writing for the Court,
Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 281
Id. at 281-88. The Court stressed:
The "condition" offending the Constitution is Detroit's dejure segregated school system, which was so pervasively and persistently segregated that the District Court found that the need for the educational
components flowed directly from constitutional violations by both
state and local officials. These specific educational remedies,
although normally left to the discretion of the elected school board
and professional educators, were deemed necessary to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have enjoyed in terms of education had these four components been
provided in a nondiscriminatory manner in a school system free from
pervasive de'ure racial segregation.
Id. Cf. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) (district court
exceeded its authority by requiring annual readjustments of attendance zones).
72 Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 288-91. Specifically, the petitioners argued that requiring the defendants to pay one-half of the added costs pertaining to the four "educational components" is "in practical effect indistinguishable from an award of money
damages against the state based upon the asserted prior misconduct of state officials." Id. at 289. The Court rejected this contention asserting that the order to
share the future expenses of the educational components qualifies as a "prospective compliance exception." Id. This exception was espoused by the Court in
Edelman v. Jordan, where the Court held that a suit for monetary damages against
the state was appropriate to the extent that it "sought payment of state funds ... as
a necessary consequence of compliance in thefuture with a substantive federal-question determination... " Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974) (emphasis in
the original). Moreover, the Court rejected petitioners claims of a tenth amendment violation, declaring that the "[t]enth [a]mendment's reservation of nondelegated powers to [s]tates is not implicated by a federal-court judgment enforcing the
express prohibitions of unlawful state conuct enacted by the [f]ourteenth
[a]mendment." Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 291.
73 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990).
74 Id. at 1655. The Court initially resolved the issue of the propriety of its own
jurisdiction, ruling that the state's petition for certiorari was filed within the requisite time period. Id. at 1660. Under Title 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) (1982), in a civil
action, a petition for certiorari must be filed no later than ninety days after an entry
of judgment by the lower court. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1660 (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2101 (c) (1982)). The Court recognized, however, that the starting time for filing
a petition for certiorari is tolled while a petition for rehearing is reviewed. Id. Specifically, the Court noted that, "[a] timely petition for rehearing . . . operates to
suspend the finality of the. .. court's judgment, pending the court's further deter70
71
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Justice White began his analysis by determining whether the district court exceeded its equitable authority by ordering the direct
tax increase.75 The Court, in recognizing the significance of a tax
increase on a local school district, insisted that before assuming
the power to tax a district court must explore other possible alternatives aimed at achieving its desired goal. 76 The Court reiterated the well-accepted principle that comity requires a federal
district court to respect the authority of a local governing institution.7 7 Justice White maintained that by allowing the KCMSD to
submit its own tax levies, the district court would protect the
functioning capacity of the board, 78 and allocate the responsibility of resolving the effects of segregation to those persons who
created the problem. 79 The Court stated that although a district

court should not grant a local school board "carte blanche" in
structuring and implementing a desegregation program, it
should at least allow the school board the opportunity to remedy
its own constitutional violation.8" The Court recognized that it
has always been the function of the local authorities to solve the
problems of public school desegration.8 ' Thus, the Court maintained that the district court's overreaching exercise of judicial
discretion in raising the tax levies of the KCMSD usurped the
authority of the local school board.82 Justice White stressed that
such drastic measures to guarantee funding from the KCMSD
should have been exercised only after all other fiscal alternatives
mination whether the judgment should be modified so as to alter its adjudication of
the rights of the parties." Id. (quoting Department of Banking v. Pink, 317 U.S.
264, 266 (1942)). The Court pointed out, however, that the starting time for submitting a petition for certiorari is not tolled when a "suggestion for rehearing in
banc" is reviewed. Id. Therefore, in determining whether the state's papers, entitled "Petition for Rehearing En Banc," tolled the ninety-day time period for submission of a petition for certiorari, the Court deferred to the court of appeals'
interpretation, declaring that the state's papers included a petition for rehearing
before the panel. See id. at 1660 n. 14.
75 Id. at 1662.
76 Id. The Court noted that conducting an exploration of alternative means to
ensuring payment of the KCMSD's share of the costs was especially vital where the
KCMSD was "ready, willing, and-but for the operation of state law curtailing their
powers-able to remedy the deprivation of constitutional rights themselves." Id.
77 Id. at 1663.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.

81 Id. See also Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) (declaring that the responsibility for resolving local desegration ultimately rests on the
local school board).
82
Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1663.
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have been exhausted.8 3 Recognizing the court of appeals' modifications as one such viable alternative, the Court charged that it
would not have been burdensome for the district court to investigate the potential success of other remedies before imposing a
direct tax increase.84 The Court explained that by enjoining the
Missouri state provisions and permitting the KCMSD to set its
own tax levies at a rate which would adequately fund its share of
the desegregation remedy, the district court would not have
abused its discretion.85 Thus, the Court perceived the district
court's failure to utilize less obtrusive means in imposing a desegregation remedy as violative of federal and state comity.8 6
Additionally, the Court rejected the state's argument that
the district court's order, holding the KCMSD and the state
jointly and severally liable, should render the state liable for any
financial obligation not satisfied by the KCMSD, and not operate
to completely disregard state law.8 7 The Court, however, rejected the state's contention maintaining that 42 U.S.C. section
1983 empowers the district court to appropriate funds at its discretion and require payment from each tortfeasor. 88 The Court
noted that prior case law does not prevent a court from setting
aside state laws which limit the ability of local governing bodies
to raise sufficient funds to satisfy their constitutional obligations. 89 The Court explained that this is true regardless of
whether such funds can be obtained from the state. 90 Further,
the Court opined that the district court had been influenced by
an earlier order from the court of appeals to reallocate the costs
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1663-64. The majority noted that the court of appeals' modifications

were aimed at granting the KCMSD future authorization to submit tax levies to
state officials sufficient to fund its budget. Id. Additionally, the Court emphasized
that the court of appeals' modifications stipulated that the district court should enjoin state laws which reduce or limit the amount of tax levies. Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1662-63.
87 Id. at 1664. The state's initial argument focused upon whether the district
court's remedial order was too excessive. Id. The Court held that this issue fell
outside of its review because it was aimed at the "scope of the remedy" itself, rather
than the manner of funding the remedy. Id.
88 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
89 Id. at 1664-65. The Court opined that in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II),
"[w]e stated that the enforcement of a money judgment against the State did not
violate principles of federalism because '[t]he District Court... neither attempted
to restructure local governmental entities nor ... mandat[ed] a particular method
or structure of state or local financing.'" Id. (quoting Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken
H), 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977)).
9 Id.
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of the remedy evenly between the two defendants. 9' As such, the
Court contended that the district court feared that by imposing
the remaining costs upon the state, the desegregation program
92
would have been severely delayed.
Further, the Court rejected the state's argument that the
modifications were invalid under the tenth amendment. 93
Although the Court recognized that the tenth amendment grants
the states powers not previously delegated, the majority asserted
that a federal court order enforcing the fourteenth amendment
does not automatically implicate the tenth amendment. 94 Moreover, Justice White contended that the modifications were valid
under article III of the Constitution. 9 5 The Court illustrated that
an order to levy taxes imposed on a local government is clearly
an act within the authority of the federal courts.9 6
Finally, the Court rejected the state's argument that the judiciary can do no more than require local governments to tax "as
authorized under state law." ' 97 The Court maintained that a state
statutory limitation may be disregarded if it interferes with requirements imposed by the Constitution.9" The Court reasoned
that to rule otherwise would ignore the constitutional obligations
of local governments as enunciated under the supremacy clause
of the Constitution. 99 The Court asserted that in circumstances
91 Id. at

1664.

Id. at 1664. The district court perceived that the state would have resisted
such orders to contribute additional funds. Id.
93 Id. at 1665.
92

94

Id.

95 Id.
96 Id. See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964) (holding that
district court may authorize school authorities to levy taxes in order to provide
funding for desegregated school system). In support of its contention, the Court
cited several federal decisions ordering the issuance of writs of mandamus to compel a local governing body to levy taxes in order to meet their debt obligations. See
Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1665 (citing Louisiana cc rel. Hubert v. Mayor of New Orleans,
215 U.S. 170 (1909); Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248 (1906); Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U.S. 358 (1881); United States v. New Orleans, 98 U.S. 381 (1879); Heine
v. Levee Comm'rs, 86 U.S. 655 (1874) (19 Wall.); City of Galena v. Amy, 72 U.S.
705 (1867) (5 Wall.); Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. 535 (1867) (4 Wall.);
Board of Comm'rs v. Aspinwall, 65 U.S. 376 (1861) (24 How.)).
97 Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1666.
98 Id. See Von Hoffman, 71 U.S. at 535 (disregarding statutory limit on taxes
where city violated contractual obligations under article I, § 10 of the
Constitution).
99
Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1666. The Court emphasized:
However wide the discretion of local authorities in fashioning desegregation remedies may be, 'if a state-imposed limitation on a school
authority's discretion operates to inhibit or obstruct the operation of
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where a particular remedy is required to vindicate constitutional
guarantees, a state may not impede the process by precluding a
local government from imposing that remedy.1° °
In concurrence, Justice Kennedy supported the Court's finding that the district court exceeded its judicial authority by imposing a direct increase on the KCMSD. 0 ' The Justice, however,
vehemently opposed the Court's implied endorsement, of the
federal judiciary's expanded power to order local officials to im2
pose tax levies.

10

Justice Kennedy initially examined the expansive remedial
plan suggested by the KCMSD and approved by the district
court.10 3 TheJustice contended that the program fell completely

outside the budget of the KCMSD and its ability to tax.' 0 4 Justice
Kennedy indicated that although federal courts maintain the authority to ensure that school districts conform to the Constitution, this power does not extend to school financing. 0 5 Further,
Justice Kennedy charged that no federal circuit court has ever
10 6
approved a direct judicial imposition of taxes.
a unitary school system or impede the disestablishing of a dual school
system, it must fall; state policy must give way when it operates to
hinder vindication of federal constitutional guarantees.'
Id. (quoting North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971)).
100 Id.
101 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice
Kennedy was joined in his concurrence by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
O'Connor and Justice Scalia.
102 Id. Justice Kennedy rejected the majority's statements concerning a judiciary's power to tax as being unnecessary for its judgment and improper for future
precedent. Id.
103 Id. at 1667-68 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Justice Kennedy criticized several of the capital expenditures proposed by the desegregation remedy, including a "performing arts middle school," a "technical
magnet high school," and a "25 acre farm and 25 acre wildland area" for science
study. Id. at 1668 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Additionally, the Justice criticized the desire of the district court and the KCMSD to
designate the entire district as a "magnet." Id. at 1667-68 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment). Magnet schools are defined as "public schools
of voluntary enrollment designed to promote integration by drawing students away
from their neighborhoods and private schools through distinctive curricula and
high quality." Id. at 1657 n. 6 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (citing Price & Stern, supra note 12, at 291-97). Justice Kennedy observed that the cost of the district court's remedial order included "$260 million in
capital improvements and a magnet-school plan costing over $200 million." Id. at
1668 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
104 Id. at 1668 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
105 Id. See National City Bank v. Battisti, 581 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1977); Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v. United States, 415 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969).
106 Id. at 1668-69 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
The concurringJustice observed that the present Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is
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Moreover, Justice Kennedy refuted the Court's interpretation of the court of appeals' modifications of the district court's
order. 10 7 According to Justice Kennedy, the "modifications"
made by the court of appeals were merely dicta; therefore, they
did not qualify as actual changes to the district court's ruling.'0 8
Next, Justice Kennedy attacked the Court's distinction between a
court ordering a direct tax increase, and a court authorizing a
local school board to increase its own tax levies.' 9 The latter,
Justice Kennedy noted, is "but a convenient formalism," and is
still aimed at eliminating a state's statutory limitations on tax increases." l0 Justice Kennedy articulated that absent a change in
state law, the KCMSD property tax levies could only be increased
by a federal court decree."'
the first circuit court to uphold such a judicially imposed tax. Id. See Evans v.
Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub norn Alexis I. DuPont School
Dist. v. Evans, 447 U.S. 916 (1980) (Court declined to approve judicial interference
with the power to tax); Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 836 F.2d 986
(6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1206 (1988). But see United States v. Missouri,
515 F.2d 1365, 1372-73 (8th Cir. 1975) (a district court may "implement its desegregation order by directing that provision be made for the levying of taxes"); Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1320 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub norm. Leggett v.
Liddell, 469 U.S. 816 (1984) (district court may impose tax "after exploration of
every other fiscal alternative").
107 Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
108 Id. Specifically, Justice Kennedy asserted that the court of appeals only modified the district court's order by requiring less obtrusive procedures for the future.
See id.
109 Id. at 1669-70 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
110 Id. at 1670 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice Kennedy observed that the KCMSD derives its taxing authority from the Missouri State Constitution. Id. The Missouri Constitution states in pertinent part,
"[t]he taxing power may be exercised by the general assembly for state purposes,
and by counties and other political subdivisions under power granted to them by
the general assembly for county, municipal and other corporate purposes." Mo.
CONST. art. X, § 1. Thus, the Justice pointed out that the KCMSD is limited by state
law, in the amount that it may raise taxes. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1670 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Pursuant to the Missouri State
Constitution, the KCMSD could only raise tax levies "to $1.25 per $100 of assessed
value." Id. (citing Mo. CONST. art. X, § 1 l(b),(c)). The Missouri Constitution further states that "[piroperty taxes and other local taxes may not be increased above
the limitations specified herein without direct voter approval as provided by this
constitution." Id. (quoting Mo. CONST. art. X, § 16). Justice Kennedy continued
that any increase up to $3.75 per $100 requires a majority vote by the people. Id.
(citing Mo. CONST. art. X, § 11 (b), (c)). The Justice concluded that in order to raise
it higher, two-thirds of the people must agree. Id. (citing Mo. CONST. art. X,
§ 1 (b), (c)).
111 Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1670. Justice Kennedy opined "[i]t makes no difference
that the KCMSD stands 'ready, willing, and.., able' to impose a tax not authorized
by state law. Whatever taxing power the KCMSD may exercise outside the bounda-
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Additionally, Justice Kennedy asserted that by ordering a direct tax increase, the judiciary disregards certain constitutional
mandates.11 2 The Justice argued that article III of the Constitution, delineating the powers of the federal judiciary, does not include the word "tax." ' 1 3 Justice Kennedy perceived that the
absence of the word tax or any word resembling it indicates the
framers' intention that taxation was an improper area for judicial
involvement. 114 Moreover, the Justice advanced the proposition
that taxation by the judiciary, rather than by the legislature,
raises substantial due process concerns. "I5 Justice Kennedy maintained that where a tax is imposed by a governmental body other
than the legislature, the protections of due process remain intact
and the citizens to be taxed must be provided with both notice
and the opportunity to be heard." 6 The Justice clarified, however, that courts are not designed to be representative of, or responsible to, the people." 7 Thus, Justice Kennedy contended
ries of state law would derive from the federal court." Id. at 1663, 1670 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
112 See id. at 1670-71 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
1 13 Id. at 1670 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Article III states that, "[t]hejudicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish." Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III).
114 Id. The Justice maintained that "[t]he judiciary . . . has no influence over
either the sword or the purse, no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of
the society, and can take no active resolution whatever." Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 523 (A. Hamilton) (I. Cooke ed. 1961).
115 See id. at 1671 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
116 Id. Justice Kennedy noted that legislative taxation does not raise due process
concerns because the citizens to be taxed are "given notice and a hearing through
their representatives, whose power is a direct manifestation of the citizens' consent." Id. Similarly, the Justice explained that where money is withdrawn from parties to a lawsuit by court order, the adjudication itself supplies the parties with
notice and the opportunity to be heard. Id. The Justice observed, however, that the
order at issue has "the purpose and direct effect of extracting money from persons
who have had no presence or representation in the suit." Id. This action by the
district court, chargedJustice Kennedy, overrides the individuals protection against
taxation without representation. Id.
117 Id. at 1672 (KennedyJ, concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice Kennedy posited:
The power of taxation is one that the federal judiciary does not possess. In our system 'the legislative department alone has access to the
pockets of the people,' for it is the legislature that is accountable to
them and represents their will. The authority that would levy the tax
at issue here shares none of these qualities. Our federal judiciary, by
design, is not representative or responsible to the people in a political
sense; it is independent. Federaljudges do not depend on the popular will for their office. They may not even share the burden of taxes
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that citizens who are not parties to a lawsuit, and whose tax bills
are increased under court order, are given none of these protections. " " Finally, justice Kennedy recognized that prior case law
has also adamantly rejected the concept of taxation as a judicial
function. "19
In conclusion, Justice Kennedy examined whether an alternative remedy, other than a direct tax increase, would have prevented the desegregation of the school district.' 20 Specifically,
Justice Kennedy criticized the district court's use of magnet
schools and the quality of education to attract non-minority students to these educational institutions, noting that a remedy of
this nature has never been approved by the Court.12 ' The Justice
they attempt to impose, for they may live outside the jurisdiction their
orders affect. And federal judges have no fear that the competition
for scarce public resources could result in a diminution of their salaries. It is not surprising that imposition of taxes by an authority so
insulated from public communication or control can lead to deep feelings of frustration, powerlessness, and anger on the part of taxpaying
citizens.
Id. (citation omitted).
118 Id. at 1671 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
The Justice maintained that in the instant case, taxation was imposed by a court that
was clearly not "representative" of the citizens of the KCMSD. Id. Moreover, Justice Kennedy pointed out that the KCMSD citizens were "neither served with process nor heard in court." Id. The Justice declared that "a district court order that
overrides the citizens state law protections against taxation without referendum appointment can in no sense provide representative due process. Id.
119 Id. at 1672 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The
Justice noted that:
This power to impose burdens and raise money is the highest attribute of sovereignty, and is exercised, first, to raise money for public
purposes only; and, second, by the power of legislative authority only.
It is a power that has not been extended to the judiciary. Especially is
it beyond the power of the Federal judiciary to assume the place of a
State in the exercise of this authority at once so delicate and so
important.
Id. (citing Rees v. City of Watertown, 86 U.S. 107, 116-17 (1874) (19 Wall.) The
Justice further noted that the Court has, in the past, rejected the opportunity to
remedy an unconstitutional tax scheme by expanding the class of those being
taxed, finding that such a remedy "could be construed as the direct imposition of a
state tax, a remedy beyond the power of a federal court." See Davis v. Michigan
Dept. of Treasury, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 1509 (1989). See also Moses Lake Homes v.
Grant County, 365 U.S. 744, 752 (1961) ("Federal courts may not assess or levy
federal courts may determine, within their jurisdiction, only
taxes..... .The
whether the tax levied by [local] officials is or is not a valid one. ").
120 Id. at 1676 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
121 Id. Justice Kennedy acknowledged:
A remedy that uses the quality of education as a lure to attract nonminority students will place the [d]istrict [c]ourt at the center of controversies over educational philosophy that by tradition are left to this
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contended that although such a remedy may be permissible in
extreme cases other equitable remedies were available to correct
the current problem.' 2 2 Further, Justice Kennedy opined that a
judicial tax increase should never be considered unless the court
has found no other alternative to remedy the constitutional violation. 123 The Justice observed that previous courts faced with
24
constitutional violations have never resorted to tax increases.'
In light of the history behind federal district court desegregation oriders, the decision in Missouri v. Jenkins provides an ambivalent holding. Initially, the Jenkins Court correctly supported
traditional rulings that placed the responsibility for solving the
problems of segregation on the local school authorities.' 2 5 The
Court wisely denounced any indication that it would allow a district court to intervene in the matters of local government by
means of a direct tax increase. Hence, the Court remained faithful to the ideals of comity, and more importantly, the underlying
framework of the separation of powers.
The Jenkins Court, however, adopted a "less obtrusive" approach to fund the desegregation order, holding that a district
court, rather than imposing a tax levy itself, may order a local
governing body to raise taxes. 126 This technical distinction
Nation's communities. Such a plan as a practical matter raises many
of the concerns involved in interdistrict desegregation remedies. District [c]ourts can and must take needed steps to eliminate racial discrimination and ensure the operation of unitary school systems. But
it is discrimination, not the ineptitude of educators or the indifference
of the public that is the evil to be remedied. An initial finding of discrimination cannot be used as the basis for a wholesale shift of authority over day-to-day school operations from parents, teachers and
elected officials to an unaccountable district judge whose province is
law, not education.
Id. (citation omitted).
122 Id. at 1677 (KennedyJ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice Kennedy charged that the expansive desegregation remedy proposed by the
district court was not necessary to unify the KCMSD. Id.
123 Id. Justice Kennedy emphasized that "[this] would require a finding that any
remedy less costly than the one at issue would so plainly leave the violation unremedied that its implementation would itself be an abuse of discretion." Id. Here,
Justice Kennedy noted, there was no showing by the district court that less obtrusive means to unify the school district were attempted. Id. at 1677-78 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) Instead, the district court considered only funding alternatives. Id. at 1678 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
124 Id. at 1678 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
125 Id. at 1663. See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I1), 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977);
Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
26
1
Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1658.
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merely disguises what is in actuality a judicial tax levy imposed
upon a local school district, and ultimately serves the identical
function.
The Court failed to recognize the severe implications of its
ruling of taxation without representation. In an effort to protect
individuals from arbitrary lawmaking, the Constitution provides
citizens with a right to due process.' 2 7 More specifically, it allows
taxpayers to elect representatives who voice their concerns
before a tax levy or other proposal is legislatively enacted.
Where this process is usurped by a judicial branch of government
that consists of unelected, life-tenured members, the people lose
their constitutional protections against non-majoritarian
taxation.
In addition, the Jenkins decision leaves district courts with
far-reaching powers to fund future remedial orders. For example, a federal district court, attempting to equalize the educational facilities of wealthy suburban schools and indigent inner
city schools, may authorize the suburban district's legislature to
submit higher tax levies in order to fund urban facilities. Thus,
the Court's endorsement of indirect taxation may ultimately lead
to undesirable tax consequences for certain tax districts. Additionally, the Court leaves open the potential for judicial abuse in
structuring enormous remedial orders that may now be funded
without the consent of the people.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the holding in Jenkins
was the Court's unwillingness to consider the size and expense of
its remedial program. 12 Unlike prior desegregation plans, the
KCMSD's program fell far outside of its budget, as well as its
ability to tax under Missouri state law.' 29 The Court, however,
insisted on implementing this extraordinary remedy, despite
127 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The fourteenth amendment states in relevant
part: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
128 Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1668 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). The total cost of the district court's remedies included approximately
"$260 million in capital improvements and a magnet-school plan costing over $200
million." Id. (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 109 S. Ct. 2463, 2465 (1989)).
129 Id. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied a rehearing en banc, stating:
[T]he remedies ordered go far beyond anything previously seen in a
school desegregation case. The sheer immensity of the programs encompassed by the district court's order-the large number of magnet
schools and the quantity of capital renovations and new construction-are concededly without parallel in any other school district in
the country.
Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1318-19 (8th Cir. 1988).
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state law limitations. Thus, the Court's perspective was overly
narrow because they neglected less expensive remedies that
could have eliminated the vestiges of segregation in Kansas City's
school system.
Federal courts are ultimately responsible for providing an efficient remedy that will rectify constitutional violations caused by
the conduct of a school district. In doing so, it must exercise
equitable discretion to guarantee that the remnants of a segregated public school district are fully eliminated. This duty to implement an appropriate remedy, however, should not allow the
judiciary to overreach its authority. Federal courts must not
achieve constitutional objectives by circumventing local financing
legislation. Such unconstrained freedom of the judiciary has the
potential to severely tilt the balance of power in our government.
TheJenkins decision has stretched the judicial sphere of influence
into local governing functions too far.
Robert T. Abramson

